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DOES ATTEMPTED MURDER DESERVE GREATER
PUNISHMENT THAN MURDER? MORAL LUCK
AND THE DUTY TO PREVENT HARM
RUSSELL CHRISTOPHER*

INTRODUCTION

Does the commission of a consummated offense deserve
more severe punishment than an attempt to commit the same

offense that fails? Almost every jurisdiction world-wide punishes
the attempt that succeeds more severely than the attempt that

fails.' For example, murder is punished more severely than
attempted murder.2 But perhaps a majority of criminal law theorists disagree with this punishment differential for consummated
3
and inchoate offenses (the "PD"). In what has been termed
4
"the standard educated view," successful attempts deserve no
more punishment than unsuccessful attempts-murder deserves
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. I
am indebted to George Fletcher, Ken Levy, Peter B. Oh, and Maria Pagano for
their criticisms of earlier drafts of this Article. Any errors are, of course, my
own.
1. E.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ
AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 82 (1988) (" [T]he practice persists in every legal system

of the Western world."); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY'. ESSAYS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 129 (rev.ed. 1988) (noting "the almost universal
practice of legal systems of fixing a more severe punishment for the completed
crime than for the mere attempt"); Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed

Attempts: Some Bad But Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 117, 119

(1995) (observing that "most legal practice throughout the world treats failed
and successful attempts quite differently").
2. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 375 (3d ed.
2001) ("Almost always, the penalty for an attempt to commit a capital crime or
an offense for which the penalty is life imprisonment is set at a specific term of
years of imprisonment.").

3.

See Michael S. Moore, The Independent MoralSignificance of Wrongdoing, 5

J. or CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 238 (1994).
4. Id. at 238. Among the adherents to the "standard educated view"
which Moore cites are as follows: JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 33
(1970); HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 423-36 (1979); HART,

supra note 1, at 129-31; Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of
Resulting Harm under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725
(1988); Lawrence Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theoy of the Law of Crimes, 3
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 262 (1974); Stephen Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A

Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 1497 (1974).
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no more punishment than attempted murder. These critics of
the PD (the "Critics") argue that whether a result issues from the
performance of an act is outside the control of the actor and is
merely a matter of luck.5 An actor should not be responsible for
that which is outside the control of the actor and which is a matter of luck.6 Thus, whether a prohibited result occurs cannot be a
part of, or increase, an actor's deserved punishment. As a result,
Critics contend, insofar as the PD is based on an actor's deserved
punishment, and not on consequentialist concerns,7 the PD is
5. Though a defender of the PD, Michael Moore concisely illustrates the
Critics' position:
It cannot matter to an offender'sjust deserts whether the wind, a bird,
or a quantum shift moved the bullet that an offender sent on its way,
intending to kill another, for these causal influences are wholly
beyond the control of the offender. What he can control is whether
he intends to kill and whether he executes that intention in a voluntary action of moving his finger on the trigger; all the rest is chance.
The offender deserves to be punished only for factors he can control,
not for chance events he can't control.
Moore, supra note 3, at 239.
6. See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, at 129-31; Feinberg, supra note 1, at
118-19.
7. There may be a persuasive consequentialist or utilitarian basis for punishing an attempt less than the completed offense. Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian theory of punishment requires that there be increasingly severe
punishment at each successive stage of a criminal's course of conduct. JEREMY
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
168 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1781) ("The
punishment should be adjusted in such a manner to each particular offence,
that for every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the
offender from giving birth to it.") (emphasis omitted). For example, according
to Bentham, the punishment for "a man's giving you ten blows" must be greater
than the punishment for merely five blows. Id. Otherwise, after already giving
five blows, an assailant "will be sure to give you five more, since he may have the
pleasure of giving you these five for nothing." Id. Applying Bentham's requirement to the punishment of, for example, murder and attempted murder, the
punishment of murder must be greater to provide a disincentive to commit
murder after a criminal is already liable for attempted murder. If they are punished the same, an actor who has attempted to kill, but has failed, would have
no disincentive not to try again. This may be "[t]he best utilitarian argument
for lesser punishment of attempts." DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 383. While both
Defenders and Critics of the PD may well concede this consequentialist argument, the debate in the literature focuses more on whether there is a nonconsequentialist basis for the PD. See Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is More
Wicked than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CAL. L. REv. 791, 792 (2000) (noting that
although there may be a consequentialistjustification for the PD, "the real challenge" is to furnish a nonconsequentialistjustification). That is, apart from the
good or bad consequences of the PD, does the unsuccessful attempter deserve
less punishment?
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"arbitrary,"' "illogical,"9 and "irrational."1 Defenders of the PD
(the "Defenders") reply that we are responsible for the results of
our actions and results do matter to our desert even if they are
1
outside our control and are subject to the caprice of luck.
The clash between these opposing views is part of the larger
2
issue termed the problem of "moral luck:" whether, and to
what extent, matters outside the control of an actor and subject
to chance and luck may nonetheless be relevant in assessing an
actor's moral and legal desert. 3 The debate has produced an
enormous literature with each camp unable to convince the
other.14 The intractableness of the debate stems from the different advantages each side enjoys. On the side of Defenders is the
nearly universal intuition, embodied in nearly every legal jurisdiction, that results do, in fact, matter. On the side of the Critics
is the seemingly unimpeachable argument from principle that
results are outside our control and a matter of luck for which we
are not responsible and do not deserve to be punished. While
Critics concede they cannot account for our intuitions and admit
8. Feinberg, supra note 1, at 118 (maintaining that greater punishment
for completed offenses than attempts is "more arbitrary than rational").
9. HART, supra note 1, at 130.
10. Sanford Kadish, The CriminalLaw and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CrM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 695 (1994) (referring to the harm doctrine-that completed offenses deserve more punishment than attempts-as "an irrational
doctrine").

11.

GEORGE
See, e.g.,

FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW

472-83 (1978);

Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Complete Crimes, 5 LAw &
PHIL. 1 (1986); Katz, supra note 7; Moore, supra note 3; Paul H. Robinson, Some
Doubts About Argument by Hypothetica4 88 CAL. L. REv. 813, 813 (2000). For discussion of the various arguments marshaled to support the PD, see Feinberg,
supra note 1, at 122-31; Kadish, supra note 10, at 684-95; Moore, supra note 3,
at 240-52.
12. The term moral luck was perhaps first coined by Thomas Nagel and
Bernard Williams. See Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONs 24, 26
(1979) [hereinafter Nagel, Moral Luck]; BERNARD WILLIAMS, Moral Luck, in
MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 20 (1981). Nagel himself
later credited Williams with originating the term. THOMAS NAGEL, OTHER
MINDS 167 (1995). For an excellent collection of articles addressing the various
aspects of moral luck, see MORAL LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1993).
13. Nagel, Moral Luck, supranote 12, at 26 ("Where a significant aspect of
what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to
treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral
luck.").
14. See, e.g., Bjorn Burkhardt, Is There a RationalJustificationfor Punishing
an Accomplished Crime More Severely Than an Attempted Crime?, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv.
553, 556 (1986) ("[L]ittle progress has been made toward a solution of this
issue in the last two hundred years."); id. at 556-57 ("In the final analysis, it is
questionable whether a compelling and rational argument on this issue is
possible.").
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they are unlikely to change the positions of practical-minded legislators," some Defenders concede that they can marshal no
rational, principled argument supporting their position. 6 Thus,
intuition and existing legal practice favor the Defenders, but
principled argument perhaps favors the Critics.
At the heart of the debate is our conflicted sense that both
sides are right. 7 That which is outside our control and is a mat15. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 10, at 702 ("There are limits, therefore,
particularly in a democratic community like ours, to how far the law can or
should be bent by reformers to express a moral outlook different from that of
the deeply held intuitive perceptions of the great mass of humanity, irrational
though they may seem to some.").
16. George Fletcher, an advocate of punishing completed offenses more
than attempts, concedes that the PD is one of a number of doctrines in the
criminal law which lack a persuasive rationale:
Admittedly, there might be stronger arguments for a position that
seems so deeply entrenched in the world's legal culture. Generating a
convincing rationale .. . reminds one of other practices of the criminal law that are widely shared and intuitively accepted-for example,
punishing completed crimes more severely than attempts... -but for
which theoreticians have yet to generate a compelling justification.
George P. Fletcher, The Nature ofJustification, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL
LAw 175, 179 (Steven Shute et al. eds., 1993). For similar concessions by
defenders of the PD as to the paucity of principled argument to sustain the PD,
see FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 82-83 ("[O]ur combined philosophical work has
yet to generate a satisfactory account of why the realization of harm aggravates
the penalty. ... We cannot adequately explain why harm matters .... "); David
Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53,
53 (1989) ("It is hard to find any rationale for our leniency toward the unsuccessful [attempter in comparison to the successful attempter].").
17. The economic philosopher Adam Smith aptly captures our ambivalence as to the relevance of results to our desert. He concludes paradoxically
that we believe, in the abstract, that results are irrelevant, but nonetheless we
somehow find results relevant in our assessment of particular cases:
To the intention or affection of the heart . . . to the propriety or
impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulness of the design, all praise
or blame.., which can justly be bestowed upon any action, must ultimately belong.
When this maxim is thus proposed, in abstract and general terms,
there is nobody who does not agree to it. Its self-evident justice is
acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a dissenting voice
among all mankind. Everybody allows, that how different soever the
accidental, the unintended and unforeseen consequences of different
actions, yet, if the intentions or affections from which they arose were,
on the one hand, equally proper and equally beneficent, or on the
other hand, equally improper and equally malevolent, the merit or
demerit of the actions is still the same ....
But how well soever we may seem to be persuaded of the truth of
this equitable maxim.., when we come to particular cases, the actual
consequences which happen to proceed from any action, have a very
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ter of luck should not increase deserved punishment, but nonetheless consummated offenses deserve greater punishment than
inchoate offenses. How can both sides, however, be right? Seemingly the only difference between, for example, murder and
attempted murder, is the prohibited result that obtains in the
former but not in the latter. And the relevance of that prohibited result for deserved punishment, as Critics maintain and
some Defenders concede, has proven elusive. So, seemingly both
sides cannot be right.
But both sides could be right, ironically, if they share a false
premise. According to Ramsey's Maxim, named after the seminal mathematician F.P. Ramsey, whenever there is a long-running, intractable dispute the two sides in opposition may well be
in agreement about a premise which is false."8 Identification of
that shared false premise could hold the key to resolving the
problem of moral luck. This Article argues that the false premise
which both Defenders and Critics share is that the only candidate
on which to rest the justification for greater deserved punishment of murder, as compared to attempted murder, is the prohibited result."9 For both Defenders and Critics, then, the
comparative punishment of murder and attempted murder is a
function of the significance (or lack thereof) of whether a prohibited result issues from an actor's conduct.
great effect upon our sentiments concerning its merit or demerit, and
almost always either enhance or diminish our sense of both.
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 109-10 (Knud Haakonssen
ed., 2002) (1759).
18. Roy Stone supplies the following concise account:
This maxim claims that where there is a prolonged and persistent dispute .

. . ,

it is often the case that the disputants .

.

. are really in

agreement about an assumption, hypothesis, premise, fundamental to
their argument, which is false. They share a common but false
premise.
Roy Stone, Affinities and Antinomies in Jurisprudence,22 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 266
(1964). Ramsey's Maxim is based on the following observation by Ramsey:
[I]t is a heuristic maxim that the truth lies not in one of the two disputed views but in some third possibility which has not yet been
thought of, which we can only discover by something assumed as obvious by both the disputants. Both the disputed theories make an
important assumption which, to my mind, has only to be questioned
to be doubted.
FRANK PLUMPTON RAMSEY, FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LOGICAL

ESSAYS 115-16 (1931).
19. One notable exception is Leo Katz's utilization of some attempters'
efforts to prevent the attempt from becoming a completed offense in his
defense of the PD. See Katz, supra note 7, at 795-806. For further discussion of
Katz's argument, see infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Both sides could be right, however, if there is something
else-besides the presence or absence of a prohibited resultthat (i) distinguishes murder from attempted murder, (ii) is not
a matter of luck, and (iii) is morally relevant to an actor's
deserved punishment. That something else would provide the
Defenders with a principled argument to support our nearly universal intuitions and existing practices, yet avoid the Critics'
objection that what is outside of our control and is a matter of
luck should not be a basis for deserved punishment.
This Article demonstrates, without relying on the presence
or absence of a result, that in some cases successful attempts
deserve more punishment than unsuccessful attempts. Part I
presents a morally intuitive basis for a successful attempter to
deserve greater punishment than an unsuccessful attempter by
comparing an attempter that endeavors to prevent the completed offense from arising versus an attempter who does not.
Part II explains how this moral intuition is bolstered by the legal
doctrine of the duty to prevent harm conceived either as a generalized duty to render aid or as the duty to act to prevent harm
after placing a person or interest in peril. The successful
attempter who violates this duty commits something which the
unsuccessful attempter who fulfills the duty does not-a culpable
omission. Since violation or fulfillment of this duty is not a matter of "outcome luck," it provides an independent basis-apart
from results-for the successful attempter to deserve greater
punishment than the unsuccessful attempter. Although this justification of the PD may only apply in a narrow range of cases,
Part III shows that for cases outside that range Critics of the PD
are forced into what perhaps constitutes a reductio ad absurdum:
that an attempt deserves greater punishment than the consummated offense.
I.

EFFORTS TO PREVENT HARM AS AN INDEPENDENT BASISAPART FROM OUTCOME LUCK-FOR ATTEMPTS
DESERVING LESS PUNISHMENT THAN
COMPLETED OFFENSES

Leo Katz has promisingly identified an independent basisnot relying on results-for successful attempters to deserve
greater punishment than unsuccessful attempters. In a series of
ingenious, but complicated, hypotheticals, Katz seeks to show
that attempters who feel remorse and take steps to prevent the
completion of the attempt are intuitively less blameworthy and
deserve less punishment than attempters who fail to take such
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steps. 2" But Paul Robinson has criticized Katz's argument for,
among other reasons, (i) the use of hypotheticals, 2 ' (ii) the
unrealistic and "bizarre" nature of the hypotheticals" and (iii)
the reliance on moral intuition and "emotional feelings" in
assessing the comparative blameworthiness of the various actors
in the hypotheticals.2 3 Rather than assess the validity of Robinson's critique, let us simply assume its validity arguendo. Building
on Katz's insight-that an attempter's efforts to prevent the consummation of the offense renders her less blameworthy for reasons not dependent on results-this Article will endeavor to
demonstrate that a completed offense deserves greater punishment than an attempt while avoiding Robinson's criticisms.
To avoid Robinson's criticism of the use of implausible
hypotheticals, consider the following actual case. In State v.
20. Katz, supra note 7, at 799-806. Given the intricate nature of Katz's
series of hypotheticals, a concise summary fails to do them justice. At the risk of
oversimplification, I will simply furnish Katz's own summary of his argument:
Consider three cases:
Case 1. Assassin Al poisons five people and they die....
Case 2. Assassin A2 poisons five people [the poison affecting a
different vital organ of each of the five]. Then he saves them by
killing a sixth [whose organs are transplanted into the five]....
Case 3. Assassin A3 poisons five people. The poison proves insufficient to kill....
The usual approach to the problem of moral luck is to compare Al
with A3 .

.

. and to convince you that even though luck is all that

separates the two, that is all right because you put up with luck in so
many other domains of life.
My approach is different. It never asks you to directly compare Al
with A3, and it does not draw on your uncertain intuitions about luck.
Instead it asks you to compare Al with A2 .

.

. and A2 with A3 ....

Without having to appeal to your feelings about luck, I then tried to
convince you that Al is worse than A2 and that A2 is worse than A3,
whence it followed that Al is worse than A3.
Id. at 806. From the Critics' point of view, in which attempted murders are
equally blameworthy as completed murders, A2 might seem worse than Al
because A2 commits 6 crimes and Al only five crimes. But, according to Katz,
this ignores our moral intuition that A2 is less blameworthy for taking steps to
prevent five people from dying. On this basis, Al deserves greater punishment
than A2 even from the viewpoint of the Critics. And since A2 commits six
crimes as opposed to A3's five crimes, A2 deserves more punishment than A3.
Since the blameworthiness of Al > A2, and A2 > A3, then, by the principle of
transitivity, Al > A3. That is, Al who commits five murders deserves greater
punishment than A3 who commits five attempts. And this justifies, according to
Katz, the PD.
21. Robinson, supra note 11, at 819-23.
22. Id. at 823.
23. Id. at 823-25.
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Smith,24 the defendant, Smith, stabbed his uncle twice in the
chest. Seeing his uncle collapse from the wounds, Smith became
"remorseful and wept. '25 He threw down his knife, hauled his
uncle into a car and sped to a hospital to obtain medical attention for his uncle. 26 Due no doubt to the defendant's quick
action, the uncle survived and recovered from the stab wounds.2 7
Upon prosecution for attempted murder, the defendant asserted
an abandonment or renunciation defense-that he abandoned
his attempt to kill his uncle. 2' Though the defendant's actions
presumably saved his uncle's life, the court ruled that the defendant was not eligible for an abandonment defense. 29 Since substantial harm had already occurred, his actions constituted a
complete attempt which cannot be abandoned.3 °
Though liable for attempted murder, Smith is clearly less
morally blameworthy for seeking to save his uncle's life rather
than letting him die. To illustrate this, let us compare Smith's
conduct with a hypothetical Smith 2. Suppose all the same facts
obtain except that after stabbing his Uncle, Smith 2 decides not
to seek medical care for his Uncle. Smith 2 decides to walk away
allowing (and intending) his uncle to die. Smith's life-saving
efforts show him to be less blameworthy than Smith 2. It was not
a matter of "outcome luck" that Smith undertook to save his
uncle and Smith 2 chose not to endeavor to save his uncle.3 '
24.
25.
26.

409 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
Id. at 1199-1200.
Id. at 1200.

27.
28.

Id.
Id.

29.

Id. at 1202.

30. Id. at 1201-02. For an interesting argument that the abandonment or
renunciation defense should also be available as a defense to complete attempts
(even where harm has already occurred), see Daniel G. Moriarty, Extending the
Defense of Renunciation, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 50-54 (1989).
31. Although not a matter of outcome luck, that Smith undertook to save
his uncle and Smith 2 did not might nonetheless be a function of other types of
luck. Thomas Nagel categorizes four types of luck:
One is the phenomenon of constitutive luck-the kind of person you
are, where this is notjust a question of what you deliberately do,but of
your inclinations, capacities, and temperament. Another category is
luck in one's circumstances-the kind of problems and situations one
faces. The other two have to do with the causes and effects of action:
luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances, and luck
in the way one's actions and projects turn out.
Nagel, Moral Luck, supra note 12, at 28. Applying these categories of luck to a
hypothetical assassin, Katz shows how the various types of luck may prevent an
assassin from successfully completing his attempt:
Luck might have caused him to be brought up to hate violence. (Philosophers call this "character luck.") Luck might have kept him out of

20041
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Smith voluntarily and intentionally decided to try to save his
uncle. Smith 2 voluntarily and intentionally chose to leave his
uncle to die. Disregarding the absence of a prohibited result
issuing from Smith's conduct and the presence of the prohibited
result issuing from Smith 2's conduct, Smith is still less morally
blameworthy than Smith 2. And since the difference in moral
blameworthiness between Smith and Smith 2 is not a product of
outcome luck, their differences in blameworthiness supply a fair
basis for Smith 2 deserving greater punishment than Smith.
Thus, the successful attempter (Smith 2) deserves greater punishment-for reasons apart from outcome luck-than the unsuccessful attempter (Smith).
Let us compare Smith and Smith 2's punishment under a
system with a PD and one without. Under a system with a PD,
Smith would be punished less than Smith 2. This is because
Smith is liable only for attempted murder and Smith 2 is liable
for murder. But the outcome for each does track the lesser and
greater moral blameworthiness of Smith and Smith 2, respectively. Even though the system with a PD reaches this outcome
only because of its focus on the absence or presence of a prohibited result, the outcome is consistent with the differences in their
moral blameworthiness apart from results.
Under a system without a PD, Smith and Smith 2 would be
punished the same. Smith's attempted murder and Smith 2's
murder would be punished equally. That Smith saved his uncle's
temptation's way. (Philosophers call this "opportunity luck.") Luck
might have caused him to have a sneezing fit just as he was deciding
whether to try to kill. (Philosophers call this "circumstantial luck.")
And finally, luck might have caused his bullet to miss its mark-the
case of outcome luck.
Katz, supranote 7, at 798. It is this last type of luck, outcome luck, which is most
relevant for the purposes of this Article. Since Critics of the PD have dismissed
these other forms of luck as unproblematic and argued that only outcome luck
is problematic, and this Article is criticizing the Critics' position, these other
types of luck will also be disregarded. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 10, at 690
(dismissing character luck, opportunity luck, and circumstantial luck as
unproblematic for determining deserved punishment; only outcome luck is
problematic). For the Critic, the former three types of luck are unproblematic
because they obtain prior to the choice to commit a crime; only outcome luck,
obtaining after the choice to commit a crime, is problematic as a component of
deserved punishment. Id. ("Fortuity prior to choice, therefore, may be accommodated to our notions of just desert; fortuity thereafter cannot.") (citation
omitted). For a discussion and partial defense of the Critics' distinguishing
between the relevance of these various types of luck, see Katz, supra note 7, at
798-99. For an elegant attempt to defend the PD based on not distinguishing
between the relevance of the various types of luck, see Moore, supra note 3. For
a critique of Moore's argument, see Russell Christopher, Control and Desert: A
Comment on Moore's View of Attempts, 5J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 111 (1994).
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life and Smith 2 left his uncle to die would be considered irrelevant. Such a system would treat Smith no differently than if
Smith, like Smith 2, had allowed the uncle to die rather than
saving his life. But despite attaching no significance to results, a
system without a PD does not track the differences in Smith and
Smith 2's moral blameworthiness. The outcome under a system
without a PD is inconsistent with the comparative moral blameworthiness (even apart from outcome luck) of Smith and Smith
2.
Under the PD, Smith and Smith 2, with their differing moral
blameworthiness apart from outcome luck, are properly punished differently. Without the PD, Smith and Smith 2, despite
their differing blameworthiness apart from outcome luck, are
improperly punished the same. Only under a system with the PD
does Smith, with his lesser moral blameworthiness, receive lesser
punishment and Smith 2, with his greater moral blameworthiness, receive greater punishment.
The comparison of Smith and Smith 2's deserved punishment demonstrates that the presence or absence of a prohibited
result issuing from an actor's conduct is not the sole basis for
determining whether murder and attempted murder deserve the
same or different punishment. Thus, in at least one case, the
shared premise of both Defenders and Critics is false. The comparison of Smith and Smith 2 also demonstrates that the different punishment of murder and attempted murder is not merely
a matter of outcome luck. Since the basis for the Critics' objection to the PD-the role of results which are based on luck-is
not the exclusive basis for the PD here, even Critics would agree
that Smith should be punished less for attempted murder than
Smith 2 for murder. As a result, both Defenders and Critics
should agree that Smith deserves less punishment than if he had
allowed and intended his uncle to die.
Of course, a Critic might object that this approach to the
problem of moral luck does not completely eliminate the role of
luck. Suppose, contrary to fact, that the uncle died despite
Smith's best efforts. Smith would have been punished for murder based on that which is a matter of luck and which is outside
Smith's control. In such a counterfactual, Defenders and Critics
would again part company. There are a number of replies to
such an objection. First, it overlooks the significance of the fact
that the actual case presents at least one instance in which Critics
and Defenders would agree that the unsuccessful attempter

2004]
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deserves less punishment than the successful attempter. The PD
is justified in at least this one case.3 2
Second, even though the Critics' objection is true-that the
role of luck has not been completely eliminated-the actual
Smith case still demonstrates that only a system employing a PD
has the capacity to properly punish Smith less, based on his lesser
blameworthiness for reasons apart from outcome luck. A system
of punishment without the PD, as advocated by the Critics, would
fail to punish Smith in accordance with his lesser blameworthiness. Without the PD, Smith would be punished no less than if
he had walked away intending his uncle to die.
Third, and most importantly, a system without the PD is
unjust for the same reason that Critics have objected to a system
with the PD-offenders are not punished according to their
comparative moral blameworthiness. Critics have claimed that
the PD is unfair by punishing offenders of equal desert
unequally. But with respect to the comparison of Smith and
Smith 2, it is the system without a PD that would be unfair in
punishing offenders of unequal desert equally. In short, though
the Critics' objection is valid, it only goes to the scope of the
resolution, not to the validity of the resolution with respect to the
actual Smith case.
II.

OMISSION LIABILITY AS AN INDEPENDENT BASIS-APART FROM
OUTCOME LUCK-FOR ATTEMPTS DESERVING LESS
PUNISHMENT THAN COMPLETED OFFENSES

Although Robinson might agree that the argument thus far
does not rely on implausible hypotheticals, he might nonetheless
contend that Smith 2 being more blameworthy (even apart from
outcome luck) than Smith is nothing more than a moral intuition. 3 While the intuition seems eminently plausible and one
which would be difficult (for either the Critics or Robinson) to
deny, it thus far is nothing more than a moral intuition. Perhaps
by showing that our intuition is incorporated into an existing
legal practice or doctrine might avoid Robinson's criticism. The
most obvious possibility, on which Katz perhaps (at least par32. There are cases, other than Smith, in which this occurs. E.g., State v.
Mahoney, 870 P.2d 65, 67-68 (Mont. 1994) (concerning a defendant who, after
stabbing victim twelve times and seeing the victim bleeding profusely, stopped
the attack, called the police, and requested an ambulance). But admittedly the
number of these cases is no doubt small.
33. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 823-25 and text accompanying supra
note 23.
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tially) relies,3 4 is the abandonment or renunciation defense.
That is, our intuition that Smith deserves less punishment than
Smith 2 might be elevated beyond a mere intuition if Smith
deserved less punishment because he was entitled to the abandonment defense. Unfortunately, because Smith caused harm
prior to his abandonment Smith is not eligible for the abandonment defense."5 As a result, we must look elsewhere to find a
legal doctrine supporting our moral intuition.
Perhaps a more promising legal doctrine to bolster our
moral intuition is the duty to act to prevent harm. There are two
possible sources for such a duty. First, the generalized duty to act
to prevent harm. Most U.S. jurisdictions, however, do not have
such a generalized duty-no Good Samaritan laws.3 6 But a handful of states" and many European countries do impose such a
duty.3 8 Second, the duty to render aid and act to prevent harm
after placing a person or interest in peril. Even though few states
have Good Samaritan laws, many states impose a duty to render
aid and act to prevent harm on one who places another person
or interest at risk or peril.3 9
34. See Katz, supra note 7, at 800. See also Robinson, supra note 11, at 818
n.13 (discussing an alternative, unpublished argument of Katz dependent on
the abandonment or renunciation defense).
35. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
36. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 98 ("Subject to a few limited exceptions, a
person has no criminal law duty to act to prevent harm to another, even if the
person imperiled may lose her life in the absence of assistance.") (citing People
v. Oliver, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142 (Ct. App. 1989); GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAw 46 (1998) (noting that "most American states" lack
a general duty to render aid); PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw 197 (1997)
(observing that "few states have adopted such a general duty to aid") (citation
omitted); John Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 382, 382 (1976)
(observing that the Anglo-American legal tradition generally does not impose a
duty to render aid).
37. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 12, § 519(a)
(1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1995).
38. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 46 (noting that "[m]ost European countries" have a generalized duty to render aid); ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 197
(explaining that "such a duty is not uncommon in Europe") (citation omitted);
Kleinig, supra note 36, at 382 ("In the Russian Criminal Code of 1845 and, since
then, in almost every continental European country, the failure to be a Good
Samaritan has been declared a criminal offense."); Edward A. Tomlinson, The
French Experience with Duty to Rescue: A Dubious Casefor Criminal Enforcement, 20
N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 451, 452 (2000) ("[M]ost civil law countries...
recognize a general duty to rescue in their criminal codes.") (citing eighteen
European countries with a generalized duty to rescue, the violation of which is
subject to criminal penalties).
39. See, e.g.,Jones v. State, 43 N.E.2d 1017, 1018 (Ind. 1942) (upholding
defendant's conviction for intentionally failing to render aid to a girl who, distraught after being raped by defendant, jumped or fell into a creek and
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Any attempt, perhaps by definition, creates a risk of harm or
peril to a person or interest. 40 At the point where an actor's conduct passes the threshold from preparation to where attempt liability attaches, the actor is posing a risk to, or placing in peril, a
person or interest. At this point, the attempter's duty to prevent
the risk or peril from coming to fruition would arise. The vast
majority of successful attempters (like Smith 2) violate such a
duty. Those unsuccessful attempters, like Smith, who do fulfill
such a duty are less culpable and deserve less punishment.
Under either source of the duty, the successful attempter
may be differentiated from the unsuccessful attempter not
merely on the ground of the presence or absence of a prohibited
result but also on the ground that the unsuccessful attempter
may have fulfilled her duty to prevent harm and the successful
attempter will typically have violated that duty. Whether or not
actual harm is prevented or not is, of course, a result and as such
outside of the control of the actor and a matter of outcome luck.
But what is not a product of outcome luck, is the actor's decision
to try to fulfill the duty to prevent harm or the actor's decision to
violate the duty. Regardless of whether actual harm is prevented
or not, the duty may be fulfilled by a good-faith effort to prevent
the harm.4 1 Similarly, regardless of whether actual harm is predrowned); DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 103 ("A person who... places a person or
her property in jeopardy of harm, has a common law duty to aid the injured or
endangered party."); ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 195 ("[A]n actor may have a
duty to rescue if the actor has created the peril .... ."); PAUL ROBINSON, 1 CRIMI("A person
NAL LAW DEFENSES § 86(c) (2) (F) (2003-2004 Pocket Part update)
who may otherwise have no duty to act, may have a duty imposed upon him if
he is the cause of the conditions resulting in the victim's peril."); Joshua
Dressier, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About "Bad Samaritan" Laws, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 971, 975-76 (2000) (noting that criminal omission liability
attaches where "a person creates a risk of harm to another person or property
and then fails to act to prevent the harm from occurring") (citation omitted);
MelodyJ. Stuart, How Making the Failureto Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRmM. L. 385, 396 (1998)
("If a person intentionally or unintentionally causes another to be in a position
of peril, she has a common law duty to assist the injured or endangered party.")
(citation omitted).
40. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supranote 2, at 378 ("When a person lies in wait in
order to kill another, or pulls the trigger of a gun [even if no consummated
harm occurs], she endangers another person's bodily security, jeopardizes the
interests of loved ones in the intended victim's well-being, and impairs society's
interest in a safe community in which to live.").
41. See, e.g., id. at 101 (noting that the duty to act to prevent harm only
arises "assuming that she was physically capable of performing the act"); ROBINSON,
supra note 36, at 200 ("An actor's failure to perform an act that he or she is
incapable of performing is no more a suitable basis for [omission] liability than
an involuntary act is.");J.C. Smith, Liabilityfor Omissions in CriminalLaw, 14 LEG.
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vented or not, the duty may be violated by not making a goodfaith effort to prevent the harm. The actor who fulfills the duty is
less blameworthy and deserves less punishment than one who
violates the duty. Violating the duty and committing the omission, since it increases the actor's culpability and wrongdoing, is
a fair basis for greater deserved punishment.
Apart from causing a prohibited result, the duty to act to
prevent harm after placing a person or interest in peril provides
an additional basis-and one which is not based on outcome
luck-for the PD. For example, consider Smith who is liable for
attempted murder and Smith 2 who is liable for murder. Smith
committed only an attempt. But Smith 2 committed not only the
attempt4 2 but an omission as well-the intentional failure to act
to prevent further harm to the uncle after placing him at peril.
Smith 2's greater punishment need not rest only on the fact that
a prohibited result issued from Smith 2's conduct. Smith 2's
greater deserved punishment may be justified by his committing
something that Smith did not-a culpable omission. And unlike
results, whether Smith 2 commits this culpable omission is not a
product of outcome luck. Thus, the unsuccessful attempter
(Smith) deserves less punishment for his attempt than Smith 2
who has committed not only an attempt but also a culpable omission. The successful attempter deserves (apart from committing
the prohibited result) greater punishment for his committing
something that the unsuccessful attempter did not-a culpable
omission, which is not a function of outcome luck.
III.

A

REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM?

ATTEMPTS DESERVING GREATER
PUNISHMENT THAN CONSUMMATED OFFENSES

The Critic might object that this approach to justifying the
PD-taking into account whether an attempter fulfills or violates
the duty to prevent harm-only works in a limited class of cases.
The approach is viable only where the unsuccessful attempter
fulfills the duty and the successful attempter violates the duty.
But what about the cases where the successful attempter fulfills
the duty but the victim dies anyway? And what about the cases
88, 94-95 (1984) (suggesting that the duty is not necessarily to prevent
the harm but merely to take "reasonable steps to prevent the peril from resulting"). That is, one is under a duty to act for the purpose of preventing harm,
but one is not under a duty to actually prevent harm.
42. Although Smith 2 commits murder, a lesser-included offense committed by Smith 2 is attempted murder. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 375 ("[W]ith
crimes of intent, the successful commission of the target crime logically involves
an attempt to commit it.") (citing People v. Vanderbilt, 249 P. 867, 868 (Cal.
STUD.

1926)).
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where the unsuccessful attempter violates the duty but the victim
survives? In both of these latter categories of cases, the Defender
and the Critic will presumably once again diverge. Presumably,
the Defender will still advocate punishing the successful
attempter who fulfills the duty more than the unsuccessful
attempter who violates the duty. Interestingly, the Critics' stance
on these cases may be less clear. If we take the Critics at their
word (that results are irrelevant and only that which is not a function of outcome luck is eligible to be relevant as a component of
deserved punishment), then the Critic's position will be shown to
be, if not a reductio ad absurdum, considerably less plausible. In
these two categories of cases, the Critics may be shown to be committed to maintaining that attempts deserve more severe punishment than consummated offenses. In any event, these two
categories of cases will be an interesting device to test how truly
committed the Critics are to their position that results are
irrelevant.
Though in these two categories of cases the approach suggested here will not resolve the problem of moral luck, the PD is
the only way to properly punish actors like Smith and Smith 2.
Of course, the Critics might concede this but rejoin that the PD
does not properly punish actors in categories outside Smith and
Smith 2. The resulting dilemma for the Critics is that with or
without the PD, offenders will not be punished according to their
comparative moral blameworthiness. With the PD, successful
attempters are punished more than unsuccessful attempters
despite, according to the Critics, their equal desert. But without
the PD, an unsuccessful attempter who fulfills the duty to prevent
harm and a successful attempter who violates the duty are punished the same despite their different blameworthiness. In other
words, the dilemma for the Critics is whether we should
unequally punish offenders with equal desert or equally punish
offenders with unequal desert. The absence of a PD is unjust for
the same reason that Critics maintain that the presence of a PD is
unjust-offenders will not be punished in proportion to their
comparative desert.
But the Critics have a rejoinder which resolves their
dilemma-punish attempts equally regardless of whether a prohibited result occurs or not, but punish attempts differently
based on whether a duty to act to prevent harm is fulfilled or
violated. In this way, the Critics would endorse a PD but still
equally punish offenders which have, in their view, equal desert.
Under the Critics' version of the PD, offenders such as Smith 2
would be properly punished more than those like Smith. But
also under the Critics' PD, unsuccessful attempters who violate
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their duty would be punished more than successful attempters
who fulfill their duty. For example, some attempted murders
would be punished more than some murders.
Though this resolves the Critics' dilemma above, the Critics'
approach may now be susceptible to the charge of even greater
implausibility. Despite the nearly universal intuition that
attempts should be punished less severely than consummated
offenses, the Critics have contended that attempts should be
punished the same as consummated offenses. If that contention
is considered counter-intuitive, then the comparison of unsuccessful attempters who violate their duty to prevent harm with
successful attempters who fulfill their duty demonstrates the Critics' position to be even more counter-intuitive. If punishing
unsuccessful attempts the same as successful attempts is counterintuitive, then a fortiori punishing some unsuccessful attempts
more severely than successful attempts is comparatively more
implausible.
Of course, a devout Critic may well be unswayed and continue to maintain that outcome luck is irrelevant to deserved
punishment even if it entails some unsuccessful attempters
deserving greater punishment than successful attempters. But
the prospect of punishing, for example, some attempted
murders more severely than murder may cause the less committed Critic to lose faith in the position that outcome luck is irrelevant to deserved punishment. And that prospect may also make
it more difficult for the Critics to attract converts and appeal to
the undecided. Whether the Critics are really willing to maintain
that, in some cases, attempted murder deserves more severe punishment than murder supplies an interesting basis to test the
firmness of their position. Either way, the Critics' position that
outcome luck is irrelevant to deserved punishment entails not
merely that, for example attempted murder deserves the same
punishment as murder, but also that, in some cases, attempted
murder deserves greater punishment than murder.
CONCLUSION

Leo Katz's insight-the relevance to deserved punishment
of whether or not an actor acts to prevent harm-provides the
foundation for ajustification of the greater deserved punishment
of successful attempters than unsuccessful attempters that does
not rely on outcome luck. Comparison of an unsuccessful
attempter who endeavors to prevent the harm of the completed
offense from coming to fruition versus a successful attempter
who does not, generates the moral intuition that the former
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deserves less punishment than the latter apart from outcome
luck. This moral intuition is bolstered by, and incorporated in,
the legal doctrine that after placing a person or interest in peril,
an actor has a duty to take steps to prevent the fruition of harm.
The fulfillment of this duty avoids, and its violation incurs, omission liability. As a result, an unsuccessful attempter who fulfills
this duty deserves less punishment-for reasons independent of
outcome luck-than the successful attempter who violates this
duty. Although for some cases fulfillment or violation of this
duty justifies completed offenses deserving more punishment
than attempts, in other cases it does not-where the successful
attempter fulfills the duty and the unsuccessful attempter does
not. There, the Critic of the PD might be forced into the implausible position of maintaining that the unsuccessful attempter violating the duty deserves more severe punishment than the
successful attempter who fulfills the duty. Whether the Critic is
really willing to hold that, for example, an attempted murder
deserves more severe punishment than murder supplies an interesting test of the firmness of the Critics' position that outcome
luck is irrelevant to the determination of the degree of deserved
punishment.

